The Price of Exposing Sanctions Violations: Bakai Bank’s Legal Attack on the Open Dialogue Foundation

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Executive Summary

Nature of the Proceeding: The report examines a civil legal action initiated in Belgium by Bakai Bank, one of the largest commercial banks in Kyrgyzstan (Bakai Bank or the “Claimant”), against the Open Dialogue Foundation (ODF). This civil action represents a clear instance of a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP).

Bakai Bank filed a civil claim in Belgium in October 2024 against the ODF regarding ODF’s two publications on ODF’s website.

Bakai Bank alleges that ODF’s publications in 2023 falsely accused Bakai Bank of participating in schemes that help circumvent international financial sanctions against Russia. Specifically, Bakai Bank seeks an order to remove its name from ODF’s reports, claiming reputational harm and lack of factual basis for the allegations.  Bakai Bank claims that although it is a civil litigation, ODF’s publications can be considered as criminal offences, of defamation for the first publication (article 443 of the Criminal Code) and even of slanderous denunciation for the second publication (article 445 of the Criminal Code). According to the Claimant, ODF deliberately targeted the second publication at the European Parliament and the European Commission, which constitutes an aggravating circumstance.

Facts of the civil claim: Bakai Bank’s claim centers on two specific publications by ODF, released in May and July 2023. The first report is entitled “Russia’s Accomplices in the War Against Ukraine. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Army’s Reliable Rear.” The report was published on 9 May 2023 and is still available on the ODF website.

The second report is entitled “Submission to the European Parliament and the European Commission on the issue of sanctions circumvention.” The submission was published on 3 July 2023 and is still available on the ODF website.

Bakai Bank’s action seeks to obtain the removal of these two publications, which present evidence suggesting that the Kazakh and Kyrgyz states are involved in circumventing international financial sanctions imposed on Russia due to its aggression against Ukraine. These publications by ODF explain that banks contribute to this circumvention, particularly by granting non-residents access to financial services via their bank cards. ODF’s publications highlight anomalies in Kyrgyzstan’s economic activity, including sharp increases in banking transactions and credit card issuance during 2022, which align with Visa and MasterCard ceasing operations in Russia. ODF’s reports draw from economic statistics, investigative journalism, and local Kyrgyz media sources to argue that certain Kyrgyz banks, including Bakai Bank, facilitated sanction evasion for Russian nationals. Bakai Bank disputes these findings, asserting that increased banking activity stemmed from legitimate factors such as an influx of Russian IT workers.

ODF’s Position. ODF denies the accusations of defamation and violation of the Claimant’s rights. The ODF report “Russia’s Accomplices in the War Against Ukraine. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Army’s Reliable Rear“. published on 9 May 2023 uses global economic data to argue that countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have become key economic hubs for circumventing financial sanctions imposed on Russia. The report highlights the highly anomalous growth in import and export rates for these two countries in 2022.

ODF’s publications were based on verified and publicly available sources, as well as the opinions of local Kyrgyz experts. The ODF’s reports are aimed at informing the Western public, along with institutions responsible for imposing sanctions, such as the European Commission, the European Council, US State Department, US Office of Foreign Assets Control, UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, as well as watchdog organizations, experts, journalists, Western politicians, and governments, about the effectiveness of the enforcement of sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. The purpose of the publications was to raise awareness about sanctions-related problems, expose instances of sanctions circumvention, and protect the public interest, rather than intentionally damaging the business reputation of Bakai Bank. The ODF acted within its mission to promote transparency and accountability in the global sanctions regime and to help close the loopholes in the existing sanctions framework.

Claim for damages. Bakai Bank seeks financial compensation from the ODF for reputational and financial harm it claims to have suffered due to allegedly defamatory publications. The Claimant demands €1,050,000 in damages, divided into two categories: material and moral damages. For material damages, Bakai Bank claims €1,000,000, citing significant revenue losses resulting from reputational damage caused by ODF’s accusations, without providing any proof. The Claimant has also requested the court to impose substantial financial penalties on ODF in case of non-compliance with any future judgment. These include penalties of €10,000 per day for failing to remove the allegedly defamatory publications, €10,000 per day per authority for not notifying relevant institutions of the judgment, and €10,000 per day for failing to publish the judgment prominently on ODF’s website for 30 consecutive days.

Procedural Developments. The Claimant requested interim measures, which were denied by the judge of the Tribunal de l’Entreprise Francophone de Bruxelles. ODF refused a temporary suspension of the publication. The parties are in the process of exchanging their conclusions and awaiting the hearing sometime in 2025.

SLAPP. Bakai Bank’s claim against ODF is nothing but a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP), a lawsuit that is intended to censor, intimidate, and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon their criticism or opposition. Such lawsuits are characterized by being without substantial merit and are used primarily as a tool to discourage or penalize free speech and public participation. There are a number of indicators of SLAPP in the civil case Bakai vs ODF:

a) The disproportionate, excessive, or unreasonable nature of the legal claim or part of it, including the excessive value of the litigation: Bakai Bank’s demand for €1,050,000 in damages, without presenting evidence of material losses, is disproportionate. Furthermore, the requested penalties of €10,000 per day for non-compliance with any potential judgment are excessive and unreasonable.

b) Intimidation, harassment, or threats by the claimant or its representatives, before or during the proceedings: The inclusion of significant financial penalties for non-compliance, such as the requirement to prominently publish the judgment on ODF’s website, demonstrates an intimidating strategy aimed at pressuring ODF.

c) Bad faith procedural tactics, such as dilatory maneuvers or procedural abuses: The delay in filing the lawsuit, nearly 18 months after the reports’ publication, reflects strategic bad faith, likely intended to exhaust ODF’s resources and deter future investigations.

d) Exploiting a power imbalance, such as financial advantage or political or social influence, to pressure the defendant: As a well-resourced commercial bank, Bakai Bank leverages its financial strength against ODF, a non-profit organization, to exert undue pressure.

e) The partially or entirely manifestly unfounded nature of the claim: The Claimant disputes ODF’s thoroughly researched and documented findings without providing substantial counter-evidence, undermining the legitimacy of its legal claims.

f) The reckless and/or vexatious nature of the action: The lawsuit targets ODF’s legitimate investigative reporting on matters of public interest, including international sanctions enforcement, creating a chilling effect and aligning with the vexatious intent characteristic of SLAPPs.

This report has been prepared in the context of ongoing legal proceedings initiated by Bakai Bank against ODF in Belgium. The case is still to be adjudicated by the Belgian court, and the information contained in this report reflects the analysis and findings available at the time of its preparation. This document was finalized prior to the submission of ODF’s final position to the court and may not reflect future developments in the case. The report aims to provide an informed perspective on the issues at hand but should not be interpreted as a definitive legal conclusion on the matter.

1. Introduction

1.1. Background and Context

The Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 prompted Western democracies to impose unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia in an effort to limit its ability to finance its war machine. These sanctions included cutting off Russian banks from the international payment system SWIFT, restricting access to global markets, and imposing trade restrictions on dual-use and military-related goods. However, the effectiveness of these sanctions has been compromised by Russia’s ability to circumvent them through third-party countries, particularly those with close economic and political ties to Moscow.

The Open Dialogue Foundation (ODF), a human rights organization founded in 2009 in Poland, has been at the forefront of monitoring and documenting sanctions circumvention practices. As part of its mission to protect human rights, democracy, and rule of law in the post-Soviet region, ODF published a series of reports exposing how countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have become key hubs for Russia’s sanctions evasion efforts.

In October 2024, Bakai Bank, one of the largest commercial banks in Kyrgyzstan, filed a civil claim in Belgium against ODF regarding two publications on ODF’s website that alleged the bank’s involvement in sanctions circumvention schemes. This legal action is a clear example of a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) – a lawsuit intended to censor, intimidate, and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of legal defense until they abandon their criticism.

1.2. Purpose and Scope of the Report

This report examines the civil legal action initiated by Bakai Bank against ODF in Belgium, highlighting its nature as a SLAPP suit designed to silence legitimate investigative reporting on matters of public interest. The report analyzes:

1. The background and operational activities of ODF, particularly its work on sanctions circumvention;
2. The political and economic context of Kyrgyzstan, including its ties with Russia and the ongoing crackdown on independent media;
3. The details of Bakai Bank’s legal action against ODF, including its specific allegations and financial demands;
4. The content and context of ODF’s publications that are the subject of the lawsuit;
5. ODF’s response to the allegations and the additional evidence supporting its findings;
6. The international significance and public interest in exposing sanctions circumvention practices;
7. The characteristics that identify this lawsuit as a SLAPP case.

By documenting this case, the report aims to draw attention to the threats faced by civil society organizations and media outlets engaged in legitimate investigative work, particularly when exposing practices that enable Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine. It also seeks to highlight the need for stronger legal protections against SLAPPs in Europe and beyond, to ensure that important public interest reporting is not silenced through abusive legal tactics.

2. The Open Dialogue Foundation’s Role in Uncovering Sanctions Evasion by Russian Allies

2.1. Operational Activities and Mission

Since its founding in 2009 in Poland, statutory objectives of ODF include the protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the post-Soviet area.^1,2,3,4 ODF pursues its goals through the organisation of observation missions, monitoring especially individual human rights’ violation cases. It also advocates for international legislation better serving human rights, such as the Magnitsky Act or the adding of conditionality clauses to EU & international financial assistance programmes directed at non-democratic states and hybrid regimes.

ODF has extensive experience in the field of protection of the rights of political prisoners and refugees. ODF is one of the founders of civil society coalitions #LetMyPeopleGo and #ActivistsNotExtremists. Both campaigns have been aimed to release political prisoners, protect of civil rights and promote accountability mechanisms for gross human rights violations by top Russian and Kazakhstani officials as well as police officers, secret services officers, prosecutors, judges, local executive bodies – executors of orders.

Based on its work, ODF publishes analytical reports and distributes them among EU institutions, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the UN, other human rights organizations, foreign ministries and parliaments, as well as the media. It is actively engaged in cooperation with members of parliaments involved in foreign affairs, human rights and relations with monitored third countries. Among other issues, ODF advocates for the reform of Interpol, the Schengen Information System (SIS), and anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) laws preventing their mechanisms from being used by authoritarian and hybrid regimes to persecute their opponents transnationally.

2.2. Work on Ukraine and on Circumvention of Sanctions

In 2013–2014, ODF organized a human rights mission to support Ukrainian civil society in their struggle for European integration during the Revolution of Dignity in Kyiv’s Maidan. Following the Russian aggression in 2014, ODF’s humanitarian aid program, started on Maidan, was expanded to help those affected by the war in the East ^1,2 . From 2014 to 2016 a large support centre was run by ODF in Warsaw under the name “Ukrainian World”, offering everyday life assistance for migrants and fostering Polish-Ukrainian integration.

Following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, ODF launched a humanitarian aid delivery program to provide protective equipment and other necessary resources to Ukraine’s soldiers and refugees in Poland.

ODF’s goal is to ensure transparency and accountability in the enforcement of global sanctions against Russia. These sanctions have been imposed by multiple Western democracies, such as the European Union (EU), the United States, and the United Kingdom. These sanctions are primarily imposed to pressure Russia into complying with international law, ending its aggression in Ukraine, and stopping its violations of human rights. They are also meant to penalize entities, institutions and individuals helping Russia in its war efforts or human rights violations. The sanctions can be, for example, in the form of trade restrictions, sectoral sanctions, or financial sanctions. For example, cutting off Russian banks from the international payment system SWIFT, and limiting their access to global markets is one of the Western sanctions aimed at weakening Russia’s economy.

ODF works to identify and seal any gaps in the current sanctions system. For that, ODF researches how Russia receives support from other countries like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and others to bypass these international sanctions.  In cooperation with the opposition representatives of Kazakhstan, human rights activists and whisleblowers from the Central Asian countries, ODF published eight reports on the matter: 

1. 22 December 2022, Report “Kremlin’s Secret Ally. How Tokayev is Helping Putin Circumvent Sanctions”;
2. 30 December 2022, Report “The Secret of Tokayev and Putin: How to Circumvent the Oil Embargo”;
3. 8 March 2023, Report “Everything for the Front. Everything for Victory. How Tokayev Helps Putin while Fooling Ukraine and the West”;
4. 25 April 2023, Report “The Beneficiaries of Russia’s War Against Ukraine. How the Nazarbayev-Tokayev Regime is Helping Putin”;
5. 9 May 2023, Report “Russia’s Accomplices in the War Against Ukraine: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Army’s Reliable Rear”;
6. 3 July 2023, Submission to the European Parliament and European Commission on the issue of sanctions circumvention;
7. 15 August 2023, Report “Russia’s Decade-Long War Against Ukraine: How to Accelerate Ukrainian Victory”; and
8. 25 November 2023, Report “Diamonds Are Not Forever: Analysing Ineffectiveness of Diamond Embargo in Hurting Russia’s Economy”.

The ODF’s reports are aimed at informing the Western public, along with institutions responsible for imposing sanctions, such as the European Commission, the European Council, US State Department, US Office of Foreign Assets Control, UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, as well as watchdog organizations, experts, journalists, Western politicians, and governments, about the effectiveness of the enforcement of sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. The purpose of the publications was to raise awareness about sanctions-related problems, expose instances of sanctions circumvention, and protect the public interest.

The goal of ODF’s reports is to close loopholes and prevent third-party countries, such as Kyrgyzstan, or entities, or individuals, from undermining the effectiveness of the Western sanctions.

As a member of the EU Transparency Register, ODF is committed to promoting transparency and accountability in its advocacy efforts. By publishing its submissions to the European Parliament and the European Commission on its website, ODF ensures that policymakers, the public and civil society have access to information on critical issues such as the circumvention of Russian sanctions. ODF’s publications call for EU institutions to investigate and possibly extend sanctions, in particular secondary sanctions, to individuals and entities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan who are allegedly assisting Russia in its war effort.

3. Context: Kyrgyzstan’s Political and Economic Landscape

3.1. From Soviet Republic to Strategic Partner: Kyrgyzstan’s Economic and Political Links with Russia

A Central Asian state, Kyrgyzstan became independent with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Kyrgyzstan is bordered by Kazakhstan to the north, Uzbekistan to the west, Tajikistan to the south, and China to the east and southeast. „Significant impediments to Kyrgyzstan’s development include corruption, aging infrastructure, high unemployment, and endemic poverty“.

Although Kyrgyzstan does not have a direct border with Russia, it maintains strong economic and political ties with its former metropole. Kyrgyzstan is a member of several regional and international organizations where Russia also holds membership, highlighting their close political, economic, and military ties. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan became a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an organization of former Soviet republics. Russia is a key player in the CIS, and Kyrgyzstan actively participates in its initiatives.

Another key organization is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance similar to NATO that is focused on mutual defense and security cooperation. Russia plays a leading role in the CSTO, providing security guarantees to Kyrgyzstan and other member states.

Kyrgyzstan and Russia are both members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a political, economic, and security alliance that includes China and other regional powers. The SCO focuses on regional stability, counterterrorism, and economic collaboration.

Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a regional economic bloc aimed at fostering economic integration. Within the EAEU, Kyrgyzstan and Russia, along with Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, work to facilitate the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor among member states.

Finally, Kyrgyzstan is part of the Customs Union, established within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The Customs Union simplifies trade between its member states, including Kyrgyzstan and Russia, by eliminating internal customs duties and non-tariff barriers. Similar to how the European Union (EU) operates a single market, the Customs Union ensures the free flow of goods among member countries without border checks or additional taxes on imports and exports. Under the Customs Union, Kyrgyzstan and Russia apply a common external tariff for goods imported from non-member countries. Once these goods clear customs in one member state, they can be freely transported across other member states without additional customs checks. This framework significantly reduces bureaucratic hurdles, costs, and delays in trade, making it easier for Kyrgyz businesses to export goods to Russia and for Russian goods to enter Kyrgyzstan.

Russia is Kyrgyzstan’s second largest trading partner, with a share of 27.4% of Kyrgyzstan’s total trade turnover with all countries. Kyrgyzstan’s foreign trade turnover with Russia in 2022 increased by 40.3% compared to 2021, while exports from Kyrgyzstan to Russia increased by 245% from USD 393 million to USD 963 million in 2022. Russia is the largest export destination for Kyrgyzstan with a total share of 44.1%, making Kyrgyzstan economically dependent on Russia.

3.2. Crackdown on Independent Media: Covering Up Sanctions Evasion and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan

It is important to consider the internal political situation in Kyrgyzstan under the rule of current President Sadyr Japarov. Kyrgyzstan has long been considered an “island of freedom” in Central Asia, with a number of independent media outlets, independent MPs and an active civil society. However, under President Sadyr Japarov, Kyrgyzstan is turning into an authoritarian state. The government has imposed severe restrictions on peaceful assemblies, especially those related to protests against Russia’s war in Ukraine and has targeted civil activists and human rights defenders with political persecution.

In December 2024, the European Parliament in its urgent resolution noted that “in recent years, democratic standards and human rights in Kyrgyzstan have deteriorated alarmingly”. EP’s resolution states that “independent media, such as Kloop, Temirov Live, Ait Ait Dese and Azattyk, journalists and bloggers continue to face repression” and “both the judiciary and vigilante violence are increasingly being used to suppress political opponents and civil society critics”.

This statement is consistent with human rights and media reports:

• Kyrgyzstan’s authorities have unjustifiably restricted the right to peaceful assembly, including peaceful rallies on the topic of Russia’s war against Ukraine.^1,2 Dozens of civil activists and human rights defenders were politically prosecuted for participating in peaceful protests in support of Ukraine.^1,2,3 In April 2023, the Pervomaisky Court of Bishkek extended the ban on peaceful assemblies in central Bishkek, while the Supreme Court upheld the ban.^1,2
• Independent media outlets, such as Radio Azattyk, have been blocked or shut down, further stifling free expression. In addition, political repression has intensified, with the detention of critics and human rights defenders. These actions have greatly limited the space for objective reporting and criticism, allowing Kyrgyzstan’s government to evade scrutiny, including its growing support for Russia in circumventing international sanctions.
• “In July 2024, the Supreme Court confirmed the closure of the organisation behind the award-winning Kloop news portal, in clear retaliation for its critical reporting. This marked another significant blow to independent journalism. Despite the liquidation decision, Kloop vowed to continue its work through alternative platforms”.
• In a joint statement issued on 6th September 2024 by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and six other international human rights groups criticised the decision to liquidate Kloop as an unacceptable attack on media freedom and called for its retraction. They stressed that Kloop is an award-winning investigative outlet that has also collaborated with the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), a global investigative journalism network..
• “The authorities of Kyrgyzstan continued their crackdown on independent outlets and journalists critical of the authorities. In a highly publicised case, 11 current and former journalists from Temirov Live, known for exposing high-level corruption, went on trial in June 2024. Arrested during raids in January 2024, they were accused of calling for riots and organising such calls – charges widely condemned by human rights groups as politically motivated. In early October 2024, Makhabat Tazhikbekkyzy – the director of Temirov Live – and Azamat Ishenbekov were sentenced to prison, while two others received probational sentences. Seven defendants were acquitted. Despite the acquittals, the convictions – particularly of the imprisoned journalists – were a serious assault on investigative journalism. In addition, Temirov Live’s founder, Bolot Temirov, remains in exile, having been unlawfully deprived of his citizenship and expelled from the country in 2022”.
• “In September 2024, the Ministry of Culture and Information threatened to block the Novye Litsa news site unless it removed an article about alleged ties between President Japarov’s 2021 election campaign and the late Russian mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. The ministry also warned the Kyrgyz RFE/RL service, Radio Azattyk against covering the story, raising further concerns about the abuse of this law to shield high-ranking officials from public scrutiny”.
• “[T]he government moved forward with enforcing the “foreign agent”-style NGO law, adopted in spring 2024 despite widespread criticism from civil society, international human rights bodies, and the international community. Under the new Russia-inspired law, foreign-funded organisations involved in broadly defined “political activities” must register as “foreign representatives,” subjecting them to stigmatising public labelling and intrusive state oversight”.

3.3. From Trade Irregularities to Banking Sanctions: How Kyrgyzstan Facilitated Russian Sanctions Evasion

Kyrgyzstan’s banking sector comprises 23 commercial banks operating through 317 branches nationwide. The five largest banks control nearly 70% of the market, with state-owned banks holding approximately 33.4% of total assets. As of December 2022, the Kyrgyz Republic’s three largest banks by total assets were Aiyl Bank, RSK Bank, and Bakai Bank – the Claimant.

Kyrgyzstan has become a key intermediary for Russia in evading international sanctions imposed after its invasion of Ukraine. According to the experts, the Central Asian nation has seen a dramatic increase in trade with Russia, with exports more than doubling from $393 million in 2021 to over $1.07 billion in 2022. This surge suggests that Kyrgyzstan is facilitating the re-export of goods to Russia that Moscow can no longer source directly due to sanctions. Russian companies have reportedly set up operations in Kyrgyzstan to bypass restrictions, leveraging the country’s access to international markets. Goods such as electronics and machinery are imported into Kyrgyzstan and then rerouted to Russia. As one expert states, “Kyrgyzstan has become a transit hub for products that Russia can no longer procure legally.” This growing role has drawn scrutiny from the European Union, which is actively seeking to close loopholes in its sanctions regime. In June 2023, the EU announced measures targeting companies in third countries suspected of aiding Russia. Highlighting the extent of Kyrgyzstan’s involvement, another expert states, “The spike in trade cannot be explained by Kyrgyzstan’s domestic consumption – it’s clear that these goods are destined for Russia.” Kyrgyzstan’s role raises critical questions about how effectively sanctions can isolate Russia when third countries play such a central role in enabling its economy.

In January 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on OJSC Keremet Bank, a financial institution based in the Kyrgyz Republic, for coordinating a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian officials.

4. Bakai Bank’s Legal Action Against the Open Dialogue Foundation

4.1. Chronology of Events that Led to the Lawsuit

On 20 September 2024, ODF received a letter from law firm Fieldfisher, Belgium, stating that its client, Bakai Bank, a commercial bank in Kyrgyzstan, demands the removal of two specific publications which mention Bakai Bank by 30 September 2024. The letter from Bakai Bank’s lawyers [available upon request at ODF] also demanded that ODF offer “our client a public apology by relaying our client’s denial statement, as The Economist and Kloop did.” The Economist and Kloop, referred to in the letter, are two local media platforms in Kyrgyzstan.  The lawyers for Bakai Bank also demanded that ODF send Bakai Bank’s denial to all institutions to whom ODF sent one of its publications, and “formally undertake in writing not to repeat any disparaging remarks [about Bakai Bank] or to make any accusation [against Bakai Bank], until you have formal proof of the reality of these accusations.” Essentially, Bakai Bank suggested that ODF could only propose an entity for sanctions after that entity had already been officially sanctioned by the authorities.

In the letter, the lawyers of Bakai Bank referred to two specific publications by ODF, released more than a year before the letter, in May and in July 2023. The first publication is a report entitled “Russia’s Accomplices in the War Against Ukraine. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Army’s Reliable Rear.” The report was published on 9 May 2023 and is still available on the ODF website. The second ODF’s publication is entitled “Submission to the European Parliament and the European Commission on the issue of sanctions circumvention.” The submission was published on 3 July 2023 and is still available on the ODF website.

The publications, which Bakai Bank demanded be removed, present evidence suggesting that the Kazakh and Kyrgyz states are involved in circumventing international financial sanctions imposed on Russia due to its aggression against Ukraine. These publications explain that banks contribute to this circumvention, particularly by granting non-residents access to financial services via their bank cards. ODF’s publications highlight anomalies in Kyrgyzstan’s economic activity, including sharp increases in banking transactions and credit card issuance during 2022, which align with Visa and MasterCard ceasing operations in Russia. ODF’s reports draw from economic statistics, investigative journalism, and local Kyrgyz media sources to argue that certain Kyrgyz banks, including Bakai Bank, facilitated sanctions evasion for Russian nationals.

On 23 September 2024, ODF replied to Bakai Bank with a request to provide ODF with the letter and all supporting materials in English, as this was the language of ODF’s original report published on the website www.odfoundation.eu and distributed to the public, as well as to Western regulators. ODF explained that this will allow an accurate assessment of the information provided and engagement in a more comprehensive dialogue. For the sake of full transparency, ODF suggested to Bakai Bank that ODF share their letter and the accompanying documents in English with (1) the office of the EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan, (2) Warren Ryan, a representative of the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, (3) the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and other relevant authorities to evaluate the accuracy of the statements Bakai Bank made. ODF informed them that it planned to provide a detailed response to Bakai Bank’s letter dated September 20 by the end of November 2024. ODF inquired if Bakai Bank wanted      its letter published on ODF’s website before ODF issued its response. Furthermore, ODF welcomed any further information Bakai Bank might wish to share, particularly regarding Bakai Bank’s financial conditions, its client base and the dynamics of its growth, especially from 2022, its beneficial owners, and its policies for preventing money laundering, combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), and ensuring compliance with international sanctions. [available upon request at ODF].

On 23 September 2024, Bakai Bank, via its lawyers, replied that it accepted the acknowledgement of the ODF’s receipt of Bakai Bank’s letter of 20 September 2024. Claimant informed that it wrote to ODF in French and provided French translations of the exhibits because French is the language of the territory in which ODF is based, as well as the language of the Courts which have jurisdiction over ODF’s association. Claimant stated that there is no obligation to provide any translation and was quite surprised by the request to provide additional information to verify the “accuracy of the statements” in the Claimant letter. Claimant stated that ODF should be aware that it should have gathered all the evidence required under the law before making any accusation. Claimant invited ODF to seek counsel from a Belgian lawyer who can advise ODF on it rights and obligations under Belgian law. Claimant reiterated the requests formulated in its letter as well as the deadline of 30 September 2024 by which the publications must have been removed if ODF wished to avoid legal action.

On 30 September 2024, Claimant informed ODF of having sent the draft summons to start proceedings before the competent court in Brussels against ODF, since ODF had not changed its position. Bakai Bank seeks the removal of references to it from these publications of the ODF, as well as compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage which Bakai Bank claims to have suffered as a consequence of these publications.

Bakai Bank requested interim measures against ODF, which were denied by the judge of the Tribunal de l’Entreprise Francophone of Brussels. ODF refused a temporary suspension of the publications. As of the date of this report, the parties are in the process of exchanging their conclusions in preparation for the trial. At the introductory hearing on 21 November 2024, the Tribunal did not grant the Claimant’s request for interim measures and asked that the parties exchange their conclusions.

4.2. Specific Allegations Made by Bakai Bank Against ODF

According to Bakai Bank’s lawsuit, ODF relies on only three elements in its publications, which Bakai Bank refutes as follows:

• The first, allegedly “statistics show growth in all Kyrgyz banks in 2022 is due to the massive arrival of Russian workers in Kyrgyzstan, especially in the information technology sector. Thus, this growth makes it impossible to establish any circumvention of international sanctions.”
• Second, ODF allegedly relies in its conclusions on an article published in The Economist, a Kyrgyz media platform, which accused several Kyrgyz banks, including Bakai Bank, of issuing bank cards to persons not residing in Kyrgyzstan. According to Bakai Bank’s claim, the local platform The Economist later published a denial by Bakai Bank of the article and also retracted its publication, thereby, according to Bakai Bank, “implicitly but definitely recognising the erroneous nature of the publication.”
• Third, according to Bakai Bank, ODF allegedly relies in its publication on an article in the Kyrgyz media Kloop, which refers to the discovery of a Telegram group claiming to be able to help Russian citizens open bank accounts in two commercial banks in Kyrgyzstan (Keremet and Bakai Bank). However, in Bakai Bank’s view, the Kloop article did not provide the slightest evidence that the accounts were actually opened using this method, with the help of information provided by the Telegram group. In Bakai Bank’s view, this (the Kloop article or the information in the Telegram group, it is not clear) was an attempt at fraud or misinformation.

Consequently, in Bakai Bank’s view, there is no evidence that Bakai Bank remotely opened bank accounts via Telegram messenger for non-residents of Kyrgyzstan, citizens of the Russian Federation, and none of the evidence relied upon by ODF allows it to make serious allegations against Bakai Bank.  Bakai Bank claims that ODF has no evidence that Bakai Bank is one of the commercial banks in Kyrgyzstan that gave Russians access to international financial transactions while bypassing sanctions.

4.3. Bakai Bank’s Demands for Damages

Bakai Bank seeks financial compensation from ODF for alleged reputational and financial harm it claims to have suffered due to allegedly defamatory ODF publications. Bakai Bank demands the court in Brussels to declared Bakai Bank’s claims admissible and founded, and to order ODF to do the following:

• immediately remove the publications, under penalty of a fine of 10,000 euros per publication per day;
• send a copy of the forthcoming judgment to all authorities to which ODF has sent a copy of the disputed publications, within 5 days of the notification of the forthcoming judgment, under penalty of a fine of 10,000 euros per authority and per day;
• publish the entirety of the forthcoming judgment at the top of the first page of its website https://en.odfoundation.eu/ without comment, within 5 days of the judgment to come and for an uninterrupted period of 30 days, under penalty of a fine of 10,000 euros per day;
• pay to Bakai Bank as damages the sum of 50,000 euros as moral damages and 1,000,000 euros as material damages, plus compensatory interest at the legal rate, from September 20, 2024. ODF may pay the damages by transferring them to the account of the King Baudouin Foundation with the reference of the association “BE for Ukraine”; and
• pay all the costs of the proceedings, including procedural and scheduling fees.

5. Analysis of the Open Dialogue Foundation’s Reports

5.1. Context of the ODF’s Report “Russia’s Accomplices in the War Against Ukraine: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Army’s Reliable Rear”

The first report that is challenged by Bakai Bank is titled “Russia’s Accomplices in the War Against Ukraine: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Army’s Reliable Rear” (originally in English) (The May Report). The May Report was published on May 9, 2023, and is still available on ODF’s website.

The May Report exposes, among other things, Kyrgyzstan’s role in helping Russia circumvent sanctions and provides a detailed analysis of the economic and political ties between Kyrgyzstan and Putin’s Russia. It reveals how Kyrgyzstan’s banks and businesses, including entities like Bakai Bank, facilitate financial transactions that enable Russia to bypass Western sanctions.

In the May Report, ODF analyses Kyrgyzstan’s role in helping Russia circumvent international sanctions, highlighting the authoritarian turn under President of Kyrgyzstan, Sadyr Japarov. The May Report identifies the specific mechanisms through which Kyrgyzstan re-exports goods, including dual-use technologies, to Russia.

The May Report provides evidence of a sharp rise in Kyrgyzstan’s exports of dual-use and military-related goods to Russia, suggesting a systematic effort to bypass sanctions. The May Report highlights the critical role played by some commercial entities in undermining Western sanctions against Russia and calls for tighter international scrutiny and regulatory measures on these financial institutions. By naming legal entities involved in this activity, such as Bakai Bank, the May Report provides transparency that is essential for policymakers in democratic countries. It enables them to craft more targeted sanctions and regulatory responses, ensuring that these evasive practices can be addressed effectively.

ODF focused on Kyrgyzstan, among other countries, because it plays a significant role in helping Russia circumvent international sanctions. As a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and a key trading partner of Russia, Kyrgyzstan has facilitated the re-export of sanctioned goods, such as dual-use technologies, to Russia. By doing so, Kyrgyzstan undermines the effectiveness of the sanctions regime imposed by Western countries.  In the May Report, ODF details Kyrgyzstan’s internal political repression, including the suppression of civil society, media, and protests, and links these actions to broader efforts to support Russia economically.

ODF prepared the May Report to inform the public on an issue of significant international interest, not to specifically damage Bakai Bank’s reputation. The May Report provides a systemic analysis of sanctions circumvention practices in Kyrgyzstan’s financial sector, with Bakai Bank mentioned as one part of a broader pattern, rather than as the primary focus. All ODF‘s conclusions and recommendations in the May Report were based on verified, publicly available sources and expert opinions, as well as its own local expert knowledge, that in total ensured a balanced and informed perspective.

In addition, the May Report advocates for personal sanctions on Kyrgyz officials and legal entities that support Russia’s sanctions evasion. This focus on accountability draws attention to the gaps in the global sanctions regime and emphasizes the need for stronger international cooperation to close these loopholes.

The May Report was published on 9 May 2023, with the information on Bakai Bank in Section 7:

7. CIRCUMVENTING FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

Due to Western financial sanctions, Kyrgyzstan’s banks have become a “lifeline” for Russians wishing to have access to international payment systems and financial transactions. A number of banks in Kyrgyzstan continue to service the Russian national payment system, Mir, despite warnings from the US about its use to participate in sanctions circumvention.

Kyrgyzstan’s banks issued 39.4% more bank cards in 2022. During the first 9 months of 2022 alone (from January to September), Kyrgyzstan’s banks issued 37.4% more Visa and Mastercard international payment systems cards than during the same period in 2021. Profits of Kyrgyz banks in 2022 increased by more than 5 times and amounted to about USD 270 million. The record growth in Kyrgyz banks’ profits was driven “by growth in operating income and foreign exchange transactions – bank card issuance, cash withdrawals and currency conversions,” said financial analyst Arslanbek Kenenbayev.

Back in April 2022, it became publicly known that the Commercial Bank of Kyrgyzstan’s representative office in Moscow had offered to issue Visa cards to Russians. The banks hastened to deny this information, saying that the office in Moscow “does not issue cards”: “It should be noted that the Commercial Bank KYRGYZSTAN provides consulting services to Russian citizens on registration of VISA cards, but the procedure for registration and issuance of the card is performed only when a non-resident client personally visits the office of the Bank in Kyrgyzstan. The card is issued only after a full package of documents is provided in accordance with the requirements of the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic and a mandatory check of the compliance control of each client. Opening accounts for non-residents, including citizens of the Russian Federation, is a normal practice in any country“.

In November 2022, the Economist, a financial publication in Kyrgyzstan, published an analysis of the performance of Kyrgyz banks in issuing debit cards to non-residents of the country:

– Eight banks in Kyrgyzstan, including Bai-Tushum, Demir Bank, KICB, Keremet Bank, RSK Bank, Finca Bank, Bank Asia and Bakai Bank issued cards to non-residents without restrictions. At the same time, as noted in the analysis, Finca Bank, Bank Asia and Bakai Bank also issued Visa debit cards.
– Kompanion Bank, Aiyl Bank, Doskredobank and Bank Kyrgyzstan opened accounts to non-residents with certain restrictions and only after approval of applications. In particular, Kompanion Bank, Aiyl Bank, Doskredobank provided debit cards only in the national payment system Elcard, and Bank Kyrgyzstan allowed opening Visa Gold, Visa Platinum and Visa Infinite cards.

In December 2022, the Kyrgyz publication Kloop published an article describing a method of remotely opening Visa cards through intermediaries. The article identifies two Kyrgyz banks (Keremet and Bakai) and two Kazakh banks (Freedom and CenterCredit). Journalists discovered a Telegram channel whose administrator offers to help Russians remotely open a bank card at one of the banks listed above using a power of attorney, after which the bank card is sent to the customer along with an activated SIM card to receive messages from the bank. The banks themselves deny opening bank cards to non-residents by means of power of attorney.

In this excerpt from the May Report, ODF referred to nine local articles that were published in Russian language. Three of them were published by Russian media outlets and six were published by Kyrgyz media outlets.

One of those sources for ODF’s report is an investigation published by the award-winning investigative outlet Kloop Media. The title of the article: „Visa for 35 thousand rubles. Russians are offered to buy Kyrgyz bank cards via Telegram“. As explained earlier in this report, since the publication, on August 29, 2024, Kloop Media was liquidated by Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Court. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other international human rights groups criticised the decision to liquidate Kloop as an unacceptable attack on media freedom and called for its retraction.

By filling gaps in sanctions enforcement with credible, localized data, the May Report aids Western institutions in closing off avenues for sanctions evasion. By making publicly available information that is often limited to local languages and less accessible to Western institutions, ODF ensures that key Western institutions have timely access to data that highlights how Kyrgyz banks may be assisting Russia in circumventing financial sanctions. The May Report’s findings present a case for these Western institutions to investigate further, which could lead to adjustments in their sanctions policies.

By releasing detailed, publicly accessible information, ODF aims to bring swift attention to these practices by Western institutions such as the EU Commission, EU Council, US Office of Foreign Assets Control, the U.S. State Department, and the UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. This direct transparency enables these bodies to act decisively, investigating and, if necessary, applying pressure to ensure that these channels for sanctions circumvention are cut off without delay. The May Report‘s immediate goal is to halt the support that Kyrgyz banks, among other entities, are providing to the Russian market in evading sanctions.

ODF’s exposure of specific mechanisms – such as the increased issuance of bank cards to Russian clients, continued access to the Mir payment system, and the remote facilitation of financial transactions – signals to both Kyrgyz and Kazakh financial institutions that their support for Russia’s economy is under global scrutiny. By highlighting these actions, ODF’s report aims to create immediate accountability, pressing these institutions to cease any services that might enable Russia to bypass sanctions.

The May Report’s findings serve as a preventive measure, warning that Western authorities may apply secondary sanctions if necessary. This proactive stance is intended to disrupt the current avenues used to aid Russia’s war efforts and to support the integrity of the Western sanctions regime. ODF’s call for transparency and accountability reflects an urgent need for these practices to end, reinforcing the broader objective of cutting off resources that enable Russia’s continued aggression.

5.2. The Context and Goal of ODF’s Submission to the European Parliament and the European Commission

On 3 July 2023, ODF published on its website a document entitled “Submission to the European Parliament and the European Commission on the issue of sanctions circumvention“ (the „Submission“).

The Submission that was provided by ODF to the European Parliament and European Commission aims to highlight how Russia circumvents Western sanctions, with a particular focus on the roles of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The Submission is basically a summary of key points of the previously issued reports from ODF, including the May Report, prepared for the convenience of the EP and the EC.^1,2,3,4,5,6

The Submission provides key information on specific goods, financial transactions, and practices that allow Russia to access resources despite sanctions imposed by the EU, US, and other democratic countries. The Submission discusses Russia’s economic capabilities, aided by circumvention practices, and suggests the need for more effective sanctions, particularly targeted sanctions on political leaders, oligarchs and entities in countries enabling Russia, such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

ODF’s Submission stresses the urgency of supporting Ukraine by closing these gaps to disrupt Russia’s economic and military capabilities. By highlighting specific cases, such as the supply of dual-use goods and financial support through international payment systems, ODF calls for coordinated and immediate action to reinforce the sanctions framework, which it views as essential to preventing prolonged conflict and sustaining pressure on Russia’s economy.

On page 6 of the Submission, ODF in general mentions that banks in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan help Russians, without specifically mentioning Bakai Bank: 

The banks provide access to Visa and Mastercard to Russians in violation of sanctions, with Tokayev and Zhaparov’s permission, otherwise the national banks of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan would have long ago penalised such banks for helping Russians. In the case of Kazakhstan, government agencies are acting as lobbyists in the US and have succeeded in getting sanctions lifted from Russian banks (Sberbank, Alfa-Bank) in Kazakhstan.

On page 14 of the Submission, ODF repeats its reports and provides the list of individuals and entities that should be investigated and considered for sanctions by the EP and the EC, including Bakai Bank:

ODF’s purpose with the Submission is to prompt these EU institutions to investigate and potentially expand sanctions, particularly secondary sanctions, on individuals and entities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan who aid Russia’s evasion efforts. For in-depth information, these EU institutions should refer to the full reports of the ODF, including the May Report, as the Submission is intended to provide only a broad picture. 

As a member of the EU Transparency Register, by publishing its Submission to the EP and to the EC on its website, ODF ensures that policymakers, the public, and civil society have open access to information on critical issues such as Russian sanctions circumvention. This public availability encourages collaborative action of European citizens and institutions.

6. The Open Dialogue Foundation’s Response and Position

ODF categorically refutes the accusations of defamation and violation of Bakai Bank’s rights. The disputed publications are based on verified and publicly available sources, as well as on the opinions of ODF’s local experts.

6.1. Unusual increase in issuance of bank cards in Kyrgyzstan

Bakai Bank alleges that statistics showing growth in all Kyrgyz banks in 2022 are due to the massive arrival of Russian workers in Kyrgyzstan, especially in the information technology sector, and not due to any circumvention of international sanctions. However, according to official Kyrgyz migration statistics, provided by the National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, the country registered net 4,551 new Russian nationals as residents in 2022, and all nationalities combined recorded a positive net migration of 5,917 people. Another source indicates that, since the start of the war, 12,582 Russians have settled in Kyrgyzstan, a relatively low level of immigration compared to other countries.

The ODF May Report explains that Kyrgyz banks issued 37.4% more bank cards, reaching a total of 1.8 million cards issued in 2022 (available figures limited to the first 9 months of 2022). The Economist, a Kyrgyz media platform, reports a 39% increase. A simple calculation demonstrates that no less than 673,000 additional bank cards were issued by Kyrgyz banks in 2022.

This increase in issuance of bank cards in Kyrgyzstan coincides with the suspension of all Visa and Mastercard activities in Russia in protest against the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russians can no longer use their Russian cards abroad or for international online payments. As Russians have only limited access to international payment systems, Kyrgyzstan and other neighbouring countries have become alternative financial channels, which explains the sharp increase in Visa and Mastercard issuance in Kyrgyzstan (37.4% in the first nine months of 2022 alone).

The discrepancy between the number of new arrivals (newly arrived Russian nationals – 12,582) and the substantial increase in card issuance (673,000 cards) is too great to be attributed to a small influx of IT professionals from Russia. Such a disparity makes it possible to assert that these issues far exceed the satisfaction of the banking service needs of Russian nationals newly arrived on Kyrgyz territory, as Bakai Bank attempts to explain. While many Russian nationals leave their country and come to Kyrgyzstan, only those legally registered as residents can claim to have legal access to banking services. This abnormal increase in card issuance certainly includes cards issued to non-residents of Kyrgyzstan. It is this access to banking services by people who are not resident in Kyrgyzstan that is highlighted in the May Report and can facilitate Russia’s circumvention of international sanctions.  While Bakai Bank speculates about IT professionals from Russia, Bakai Bank has not disclosed to the court its financial position, client base and the dynamics of its growth since 2022.

6.2. Unusual rise in profits for Kyrgyz banks

In 2022, Kyrgyz banks saw an extraordinary rise in profits. In the first quarter of 2023 (January-March), the profits of Kyrgyzstan’s commercial banks almost tripled. “The total profit of Kyrgyzstan’s commercial banks for January-March 2023, according to preliminary data from the National Bank, was 5 billion 414 million soms. […] At the end of last year, the total profit of banks amounted to 23.1 billion KGS, which is a record in the country’s history. In 2021, KR banks earned only KGS 3.6 billion, in 2020 – KGS 2.3 billion, in 2019 – KGS 3 billion”.

The extraordinary increase in the profits of Kyrgyz banks, which more than quintupled in 2022, highlights further anomalies in Bakai Bank’s position. The Economist article provides an overview of the financial performance of Kyrgyz banks in 2022, highlighting the record profits recorded by the sector as a whole. More specifically, three local banks mentioned in the disputed publications, Bakai Bank, Demir Bank and RSK Bank, are ranked among the ten best-performing banks in Kyrgyzstan. While the net profit of Kyrgyz banks increased by an average of 422% in 2022, Bakai Bank’s profit jumped by1,203% to 4.2 billion soms from 325 million soms in 2021. Kyrgyz experts, including financial analyst Arslanbek Kenenbayev, quoted in the May Report, attribute these high profits to factors such as increased demand for foreign exchange transactions – issuing bank cards, cash withdrawals and currency conversions. These indicators suggest activity that goes beyond the needs of a limited number of IT workers. The abnormal jump inBakai Bank’s profit by 1,203% is more about potential circumvention of sanctions than the day-to-day financial needs of a relatively small number of new entrants or organic changes in the market of Kyrgyzstan

In its May Report, ODF specifically drew attention to the fact that, as a result of Western financial sanctions, Kyrgyzstan’s banks have become a “lifeline” for Russians seeking access to international payment systems and financial transactions. This assertion is supported by the overall performance of the Kyrgyz banking sector.

ODF, as a watchdog body, reports in good faith on potential red flags and presents information that requires further independent scrutiny by the Western institutions responsible for the sanctions regime. The purpose of mentioning these statistics in the May Report is to draw attention to the unusual growth in the Kyrgyz banking sector following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as these patterns may indicate flaws in the sanctions regime. ODF does not attribute this abnormal growth in Kyrgyzstan’s banking sector solely and specifically to Bakai Bank. It mentions other banks in Kyrgyzstan in the May Report and, in providing general statistics, raises an alarm and calls for this information to be investigated further.

6.3. Bakai Bank’s claim that The Economist „implicitly but definitely recognises the erroneous nature of the publication.”

Bakai Bank claims that the November 2022 article in The Economist, the Kyrgyz media platform, is not a reliable source and ODF should have not relied on it. Bakai Bank cites as evidence that on 23 May 2023 that newspaper published a press release written by Bakai Bank in which the bank explained that it condemned the aggression against Ukraine and complied with the financial sanctions. According to Bakai Bank, the original article quoted by ODF was removed from the Kyrgyz media platform’s website.

However, Bakai Bank did not react to the publication of this article in November 2022; it appears that ODF’s citation of this article in its May 2023 report motivated the bank to send a denial to The Economist in the same month. This timing suggests that Bakai Bank’s concern stems not from the accuracy of the article, but from its international exposure in the ODF report. If the information had truly been inaccurate, it seems likely that Bakai Bank, with ample resources to monitor and respond to defamatory content, would have issued a denial promptly after its initial publication in November 2022.

Under Article 17 of the Law on the Media of the Kyrgyz Republic, individuals or organisations have the right to demand the retraction of publicly disseminated information that does not correspond to reality or offends their honour and dignity. If media coverage infringes their rights or legitimate interests, these parties have the right to publish a response in the same media. This retraction or response must be published in a special section or in the same place and in the same font as the original article, and in newspapers, no later than one month after the date of the request. Accordingly, it is unlikely that The Economistwould have delayed publication of the claimant’s press release until 23 May 2023 if it had received the claimant’s press release shortly after publication of the article on 19 November 2022.

At the same time, Bakai Bank‘s press release press release published on 23 May 2023 does not provide any real denial of the information published by The Economist in October. On the contrary, Bakai Bank justifies the difficulty for it to operate under the sanctions imposed against Russia: “Anti-war sanctions automatically affect us as companies operating in this region; and the fact that the economies of Kyrgyzstan and Russia are so closely linked that to demand that we abandon any economic or trade interaction with Russia without any support is cheap populism, which will lead to the collapse of the economy of our republic.” In its statement, Bakai Bank goes on to state that it does not issue remote VISA cards and for the rest considers that issuing other types of bank cards is not prohibited. Bakai Bank adds that it does issue bank cards, but only with the customer’s personal identification. This statement remains very partial and does not justify ODF withdrawing its publication. Bakai Bank thus appears to be admitting that it issues unrestricted cards to Russian nationals who are allegedly using Kyrgyzstan for banking.

Bakai Bank claims that the November 2022 article in The Economist quoted by ODF was withdrawn from the site of The Economist, which, according to Bakai Bank, implicitly demonstrates the erroneous nature of the publication. However, this article can still be found online on the website of The Economist.

6.4. Bakai Bank’s claim that Kloop’s article is not a reliable source

In the May Report, the ODF stated, inter alia: “In December 2022, the Kyrgyz publication Kloop published an article describing a method of remotely opening Visa cards through intermediaries.  The article identifies two Kyrgyz banks (Keremet and Bakai) and two Kazakh banks (Freedom and CenterCredit). Journalists discovered a Telegram channel whose administrator offers to help Russians remotely open a bank card at one of the banks listed above using a power of attorney, after which the bank card is sent to the customer along with an activated SIM card to receive messages from the bank. The banks themselves deny opening bank cards to non-residents by means of power of attorney”.

Bakai Bank claims that the Kloop publication explicitly states that the banks have denied opening accounts for non-residents using the method described in the article. Furthermore, neither the Kloop article nor the ODF reports provide any evidence that accounts were actually opened using this denounced method. On the contrary, according to Bakai Bank, this was likely an attempt at fraud or misinformation. Therefore, Bakai Bank argues that ODF did not have sufficient grounds to make serious accusations against it based on this information.

Bakai Bank, in its attack on ODF, criticises the quality of the investigative work of Media Kloop, an outlet specialising in the fight against corruption and recognised for its independence, having collaborated internationally with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the OCCRP (Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project). In August 2024, the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan confirmed the judicial liquidation of Kloop Media. The outlet was accused of criticising the government and manipulating information to encourage readers to join anti-government demonstrations. This court decision has been criticised by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and five other international human rights groups as an unacceptable attack on media freedom, and they have called for it to be reversed. In December 2024, this repression was also denounced by the European Parliament which, in its urgent resolution, noted that “in recent years, democratic standards and human rights in Kyrgyzstan have deteriorated alarmingly”. EP’s resolution states that “independent media, such as Kloop, Temirov Live, Ait Ait Dese and Azattyk, journalists and bloggers continue to face repression” and “both the judiciary and vigilante violence are increasingly being used to suppress political opponents and civil society critics”.

By claiming that Kloop was a source of disinformation, Bakai Bank is repeating the accusations made by the Kyrgyz authoritarian regime against an internationally recognised independent news outlet. On reading the article, it becomes clear that its content is the result of genuine journalistic investigation.

To date, ODF sees no serious reason to doubt the content of the Kloop article. On the contrary, ODF notes that similar information is circulating on the networks and is easily accessible. In addition to the sources cited in the report and May’s conclusions, ODF has identified other publicly available documents that confirm the systemic nature of sanctions circumvention practices within Kyrgyzstan’s financial sector, including Bakai bank.

ODF did not state that Bakai Bank itself facilitated the opening of remote accounts for non-residents. It reported that the reputable Kyrgyz media outlet Kloop had identified a Telegram channel administrator offering such services involving specific Kyrgyz banks, including Bakai Bank, with the process allegedly being carried out by proxy, rather than travelling to Kyrgyzstan and visiting the bank in person. The ODF May Report did mention that the banks concerned had indeed denied being involved in the practices exposed by the Kloop article. The aim of the May 2023 report in citing this example was to highlight possible vulnerabilities in the Kyrgyz financial system.

7. Additional Sources of Information for the Open Dialogue Foundation

7.1 Additional substantiate practices of Kyrgyzstan’s financial sector that undermine sanctions against Russia

In addition to the sources cited in the May Report and Submission, ODF has identified further publicly available materials that further substantiate practices within Kyrgyzstan’s financial sector that undermine sanctions against Russia, including activities involving Bakai Bank. These additional sources have offered critical insights and reinforced the conclusions drawn in the May Report and Submission, further highlighting the role of local banks, including Bakai Bank, in facilitating Russia’s access to financial systems and restricted goods. Various Russian and Kyrgyz sources provided relevant factual context that led ODF to recommend Bakai Bank, along with other Kyrgyz banks, for inclusion on the Western sanctions list.

On March 31, 2023, The Economist, a Kyrgyz platform, published an article titled “Bakai Bank Temporarily Waives Minimum Balance Requirement for Foreigners When Opening a Card,” which stated the following: “From April 1 to June 30, 2023, foreigners opening new accounts at Bakai Bank no longer need to deposit $100 as a minimum balance. It is worth noting that non-residents can obtain a Visa or Elkart plastic debit card at any bank office. The call center noted that only a passport is required”.

This article explicitly states that “non-residents can obtain a Visa or Elkart plastic debit card at any bank office of Bakai Bank.  Moreover, Bakai Bank was willing to provide better financial conditions to foreigners, non-residents of Kyrgyzstan, than to citizens and residents of Kyrgyzstan, by waiving a minimum balance requirement. This indicates that Russian nationals, among other foreign citizens, could access international payment systems like Visa without needing to be residents of Kyrgyzstan. This policy, which potentially facilitated access for Russian nationals to global financial networks, raising ODF‘s concerns about the bank’s role in enabling sanctions circumvention.

In fact, on March 31, 2023, this information was published on the website of the Claimant as a promotional announcement from Bakai Bank offering an incentive to attract new non-resident customers to apply for Visa Classic and Visa Gold cards:

“Dear customers, We are pleased to announce the elimination of the minimum balance requirement on newly issued international Visa Classic and Visa Gold bank cards for non-resident clients of the Kyrgyz Republic. The promotional period extends from April 1, 2023, to July 1, 2023”.

The offer was specifically for non-resident clients of Bakai Bank – individuals who do not live in Kyrgyzstan but may use the international banking services. This means that when clients who were not residents of Kyrgyzstan and are applying for these types of cards, they did not need to maintain a minimum balance in their accounts. This could make it more attractive and easier for foreign clients to open and use bank accounts in Kyrgyzstan, especially for those who may not want to deposit a significant amount of money in a Kyrgyz bank.

While preparing the May Report, ODF reviewed several Telegram groups (similar to @VisaMasterCardRussia, https://t.me/Bakai_Bank_Kyrgyzstan, https://t.me/mbank_cardand) and online forum discussions in Russia that actively promoted the services of Bakai Bank and other Kyrgyz banks to Russian nationals who are non-residents of Kyrgyzstan. These services were not only offered to individuals traveling to Kyrgyzstan briefly but also targeted those seeking to bypass in-person requirements by accessing financial services remotely, with no need to visit the country or Bakai Bank directly.

A post dated, 14 April 2022, in the Telegram group “Bank cards in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan for citizens of the Russian Federation” (@bank_cards_kz)  stated the following:

“Multicurrency bank card in Kyrgyzstan (Bakai Bank) for citizens of Russia and Belarus!
We make you 2 cards: 
1) Dollar nominal Visa card
2) Elkart-Mir (EURO, RUB accounts are opened in the application).
You can replenish accounts from Russian Mir cards and withdraw to the same from Elkart card.
You are required: scan of your passport + notary power of attorney for our employee.
Cost : 26000 rubles
Term: 14-18 days
For all questions write to: @manager_immigration_assistance
Our phone number: +7 (495) 109-25-04”

In the Telegram group Immigration Assistance (@immigration_assistance), a post was published on 17 January 2023, advertising remote opening of bank cards in Kyrgyzstan at Bakai Bank:

“‼️Current offers for remote opening of bank cards in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan without your presence:
1) Freedom Finance (Kazakhstan)
Card type: Mastercard
Multi-currency card in 4 currencies: dollar, euro, tenge, ruble.
Cost: 29 900 rubles (Special offer!)
Lead time: 2 weeks
2) Bank Centre Credit (Kazakhstan)
Card type: Mastercard
Multi-currency card in 4 currencies: dollar, euro, tenge, ruble.
Cost: 38 000 rubles
Lead time: 2 weeks
3) Bakai Bank (Kyrgyzstan)
Type of card: Visa (USD currency) and Elcard (Soma currency).
Cost: 48 000 rub (for this price 2 cards in USD and soms will be made)
Lead time: 2-3 weeks

For all questions: @manager_ia”

There were a number of posts on VC.ru, a Russia-based digital media platform for entrepreneurs and startups, explaining how to circumvent Russian sanctions restrictions and open bank accounts in so-called “friendly jurisdictions.” “Friendly jurisdictions” for Russia refer to countries that facilitate ways for Russian individuals and businesses to circumvent the sanctions imposed by Western nations.

A post, dated 2 October 2022, entitled “How to open a bank card in Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyzstan) – end of September 2022” (“Как открыть банковскую карту в Кыргызстане (Киргизии) – конец сентября 2022”) author, Dmitry Mikhailov, states the following:

““As many people already know, it is impossible to use Russian bank cards in the world. Yes, there are ‘world’ cards that can help in some places, but now they are increasingly being abandoned in our ‘friendly’ countries. And at the exchange rate you will lose very well.
[…]
Why Kyrgyzstan?
Well, first of all, it was easier to get here
There are too many people in Kazakhstan at the moment, just the kilometre-long queue to get an IIN, without which they won’t issue you a card.
Initially I thought of flying to Uzbekistan, but they recently introduced a rule that you have to live in the country for 15 days before you can apply for a card. And with my luck, on the 15th day they would say you now have to live for 2 months.
Which bank should I choose?
In fact, there are not many banks in Kyrgyzstan ready to open cards for foreigners without residency. So far 2 banks, KICB and Bakai Bank, have opened cards”.

7.2. Visa and Elcart: Evidence of Bakai Bank’s Card Issuance to Non-Residents Before the ODF’s Report

As the post presented above, there was already substantial evidence prior to or at the time of the ODF’s May Report. Bakai Bank issued two types of cards to non-residents of Kyrgyzstan that were of interest to Russian nationals who were cut off from international financial payment systems: Visa and Elcart. For that, officially, Bakai bank required a very basic set of documents from non-resident Russian nationals: a Russian internal passport (internal Russian ID), a Russian travel passport with a stamp of crossing the border to Kyrgyzstan, and local phone number. However, as stated above, there were ways to receive Bakai Bank’s card without travelling to Kyrgyzstan.

“Elcard” is a bank card issued by a Kyrgyz provider of electronic payment systems for domestic transactions within Kyrgyzstan, JSC “Interbank Processing Center” (Межбанковский Процессинговый Центр). It issues its own bank cards and offers electronic payment services similar to those of MasterCard and Visa, but specifically for use within Kyrgyzstan.

The Russian website “Easy Cards”, https://easycrds.ru, “helps Russian citizens obtain foreign bank cards» and states, «our team will help you remotely obtain an international card for foreign currency transactions”. The website “Easy Cards” is one of many services that provides such services. “Easy Cards” offers cards from four countries: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Armenia.

In Kyrgyzstan, “Easy Cards” offer cards of four banks, including Bakai Bank: “A card from Bakai Bank is one of the leading products, allowing you to enjoy impressive financial freedom.” (In original Russian: “Карта от банка Bakai Bank – один из лидирующих продуктов, позволяющий насладиться впечатляющей финансовой свободой”). The site specifically states that a top up of a Visa card from Bakai Bank can be done using Russian banks Tinkoff and MTS Bank, as well as via international transfers.

Another Russian website, easypayments.online, advertised remote opening a bank account in Kyrgyzstan:

“The withdrawal of VISA and MasterCard from Russia has led to the development of ‘card tourism’ in CIS countries: Russians are turning to foreign banks to open an account. Kyrgyzstan has become one of the popular destinations. The number of bank cards issued in this country increased by 33.1% in 2022.
[…]
Opening an account with a bank in Kyrgyzstan for Russians has the following advantages:
The possibility of free service.
[…]
Simple procedure of registration. It is possible to open an account in Kyrgyzstan remotely through an intermediary company or in person.
[…]
Which banks in Kyrgyzstan open accounts for Russians
[…]
JSC ‘BAKAI BANK’
The Bank has been in existence for 25 years. It can be used by both individuals and legal entities. In 2020 Moody’s agency assigned a rating to ‘Bakai Bank’, which makes it the only bank in Kyrgyzstan with an international credit rating. Available payment systems: VISA and Elcart. Depending on the tariff, the annual service fee and commission will vary.”

After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent cutoff of Russian banks from international payment systems, Russian nationals turned to Kyrgyz banks, like the Claimant. During its research on sanctions circumvention, ODF found that, according to numerous online sources, Bakai Bank issued two types of bank cards – Visa and Elcart – Russian nationals who were non-residents of Kyrgyzstan. These cards helped them access international payment systems and transfer funds from their Russian accounts. However, a top up of a Visa card issued by Bakai Bank can be done directly from at least two popular Russian banks, Tinkoff and MTS Bank, as well as via international transfers.

The Visa card allowed Russians to use international payment services, which were otherwise restricted due to sanctions. The Elcart card, issued in the local Kyrgyz currency (som), enabled them to transfer money from their Russian cards (including the Russian Mir card) to the Kyrgyz-issued Visa card. The Elcart card acted as an intermediary, allowing them to make payments, transfer funds, and withdraw cash within Kyrgyzstan while ultimately accessing their funds on an international Visa card. Twenty one, including the Claimant, out of twenty two Kyrgyz banks, issued Elcard. Elcard was integrated with the Russian payment system Mir in March 2022.

On February 23, 2024, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on Russian JSC “National Payment Card System”, the operator of the Mir payment system in Russia. To reduce the risk of secondary sanctions, Interbank Processing Center, which runs Elcart, announced it would end its relationship with the Russian Mir system starting 5 April 2024. The ODF is convinced that this was made possible, in part, by NGOs like ODF and international media, who exposed the loopholes and how Kyrgyz banks, including Bakai Bank, assisted Russia in circumventing Western restrictions.

However, the problem remains. Despite the claims of Bakai Bank that it has not opened cards to non-resident Russian nationals, many platforms have continued to recommend Bakai Bank to the Russian clients. Not every bank in Kyrgyzstan has been advertised this way.

The promotion of Bakai Bank’s services for remote account openings and card issuance raised serious concerns about Bakai Bank’s involvement in facilitating sanctions circumvention and exploiting financial channels to provide Russians with unauthorized access to international payment systems. This evidence convinced ODF in the need for closer scrutiny of Bakai Bank’s practices. ODF’s comprehensive research led to its public recommendation to include Bakai Bank on sanctions lists due to Bakai Bank’s apparent involvement in facilitating access to financial services that may enable circumvention of Western sanctions on Russia.

8. International Significance and Public Interest in the ODF’s Reporting

8.1. Western Responses to Sanctions Circumvention

The public interest in ODF’s report is rooted in the critical role of sanctions enforcement and the prevention of sanctions circumvention, particularly in light of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. ODF’s findings highlight potential loopholes that allow Russia to access restricted goods and financial services, raising awareness about an issue that has significant implications for global security. The ODF’s reports, including the May Report, help to maintain the integrity of the Western sanctions regime. As shown by strong responses from the US, the UK, and the EU, there is a broad, coordinated effort to pressure Kyrgyzstan and other countries that help Putin’s Russia to halt any support for Russia’s sanctions evasion.

Matters related to sanctions and potential circumvention are of significant public interest, which justifies the publication of such materials. Moreover, there has been a strong international response and political pressure on the authorities of Kyrgyzstan to cease assisting Russia in circumventing sanctions. Following the publication of ODF’s May Report and Submission, as well as other international media and NGOs publications, which detailed concerns about Kyrgyz authorities and entities potentially aiding Russian sanctions evasion, the United States Senate formally addressed these issues in a letter to Kyrgyzstan in August 2023. This letter, sent to Kyrgyz officials, urged compliance with sanctions to prevent Russia from accessing restricted goods and financial services through Kyrgyz intermediaries. The US expressed alarm over Kyrgyz companies’ possible involvement in exporting goods to Russia that could support its military actions in Ukraine. The letter marks a significant escalation in US diplomatic efforts, emphasizing that any assistance to Russia in bypassing international sanctions would have serious consequences, potentially including secondary sanctions on Kyrgyz businesses. This US intervention underscores international awareness and concern about Kyrgyzstan’s role in supporting Russian access to global markets and military-relevant goods.

8.2. Actions by the US, EU, and UK Governments

In July 2023, „hours after Kyrgyzstan’s head of national security declared on Thursday that no company in his country has violated US sanctions against Russia, the US Treasury announced sanctions against four Kyrgyz firms for doing exactly that.” „All four sanctioned companies were registered in Kyrgyzstan soon after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and they all supply dual-use goods to Russia, including to firms that have supplied electronics to Russia-based defence companies“. “Kyrgyzstan, while small relative to other countries, is a clear example of every factor at play at once to create an unacceptably [sanctions] evasion-friendly environment”.

On 24 August 2023, “the European Parliament’s Foreign Committee chair David McAllister has urged Kyrgyzstan to ensure compliance with international sanctions against Russia amid growing concerns that countries in Central Asia are being used to bypass the measures”.

McAllister said during a visit to Bishkek on August 24, where he met with President Sadyr Japarov: “International sanctions are aimed not at Kyrgyzstan but at aggressor countries such as Russia and Belarus. We understand Kyrgyzstan’s situation and its involvement in organizations like the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), however, we condemn any country’s efforts to evade these sanctions, including the illicit export and import of goods on the sanctions list”.

On 13 June 2024, the UK government imposed sanctions on 50 individuals and entities, including one entity from Kyrgyzstan, to degrade Putin’s war machine, in co-ordinated action with G7 partners to support Ukraine. These new sanctions were imposed to bear down on Russia’s ability to fund and equip its war machine and show the UK’s support for Ukraine. This action was also made possible through the efforts of civil society representatives, NGOs like the ODF, and the media, whose work has been instrumental in bringing attention to issues of sanctions circumvention.

In June 2024, the US sanctioned two more companies from Kyrgyzstan – Transit Service Bishkek (TSB LLC) and Nova Proekt. They were posted on updated list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List) of the US Department of Treasury website.

Moreover, as stated earlier in this report, in January 2025, the US Department of the Treasury sanctioned OJSC Keremet Bank, a bank based in the Kyrgyz Republic, for coordinating a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian officials.

9. Why is Bakai Bank’s Claim a SLAPP?

9.1. Sources on SLAPP: European Directive and Council of Europe Resolution

Bakai Bank’s claim against ODF is nothing but a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP), a lawsuit that is intended to censor, intimidate, and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defence until they abandon their criticism or opposition. Such lawsuits are characterized by being without substantial merit and are used primarily as a tool to discourage or penalize free speech and public participation. SLAPPs are not just damaging to the defendants but also to public interest as they chill democratic discourse and inhibit community involvement.

Sources on SLAPP: European Directive and Council of Europe Resolution. The European legal framework has recognized the dangers posed by SLAPPs and has taken steps to counteract them. The two key documents that address the issue of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) in Europe are:

1. the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe’s Recommendation CM/Rec(2024)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on countering the use of SLAPPs adopted 5 April 2024, that aims at combating the use of SLAPPs by ensuring a safe and supportive environment for public participation. It outlines that Council of Europe member states should enact safeguards that prevent legal systems from being tools of intimidation against those engaged in public debates; and
2. Directive (EU) 2024/1069, adopted on 11 April 2024, on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’): This directive of the European Parliament and the Council addresses the protection of persons engaging in public debate from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive legal proceedings. It aims to ensure that civil proceedings, which have cross-border implications and distort public debate, do not succeed in silencing participants in the public domain.

9.2. Indicators of SLAPP in the Bakai Bank vs. ODF Case

The lawsuit initiated by Bakai Bank against ODF showcases several indicators that are typical of a SLAPP, as outlined in the Recommendations of the Council of Europe:

• Disproportionate and Excessive Claims: Bakai Bank’s demand for €1,050,000 in damages, without substantial proof of such damages, exemplifies the disproportionate nature of SLAPP claims. The additional imposition of €10,000 per day for non-compliance underscores the excessive and unreasonable demands often seen in SLAPP cases.
• Intimidation Tactics: The requirement for ODF to prominently publish a judgment against itself on its website is a tactic aimed at intimidating and pressuring the organization. Such measures go beyond seeking remedial action and are intended to discourage ODF from continuing its activities.
• Bad Faith Litigation: The significant delay in filing the lawsuit – 18 months after the publication of the reports – suggests strategic litigation intended to deplete ODF’s resources and dissuade them from their investigative journalism.
• Exploitation of Power Imbalances: Bakai Bank’s use of its financial and legal resources to challenge ODF, a non-profit organization, highlights the exploitation of power imbalances typical in SLAPP cases.
• Baseless Claims: The lawsuit disputes the findings of ODF’s thoroughly researched reports without providing substantial evidence to the contrary, indicating that the claims might be manifestly unfounded.
• Vexatious Litigation: By targeting legitimate investigative reporting on matters of public interest, the lawsuit aims to create a chilling effect on free speech, aligning with the vexatious and retaliatory nature characteristic of SLAPPs.

The action taken by Bakai Bank fits the profile of a SLAPP, designed to inhibit ODF’s ability to engage in its mission of promoting transparency and accountability in matters of public interest, including the scrutiny of international sanctions enforcement. This lawsuit serves as a paradigmatic example of how legal systems can be misused to silence and intimidate those who seek to participate in public debates and hold entities accountable to the public.

10. Recommendations

Based on the analysis of Bakai Bank’s SLAPP suit against the Open Dialogue Foundation, the following recommendations are proposed for the EU:

Strengthen Anti-SLAPP Protections – expedite the implementation of anti-SLAPP remedies in international and national law, like the EU Directive (EU) 2024/1069 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims.

Apply Anti-SLAPP Principles – consider the SLAPP indicators outlined in this report when evaluating Bakai Bank’s claim against ODF, including the disproportionate damages sought and the timing of the legal action.

Procedural Safeguards – implement early dismissal procedures for cases that exhibit clear SLAPP characteristics, preventing protracted litigation that drains defendants’ resources

11. Conclusion

The Bakai Bank lawsuit against the Open Dialogue Foundation represents a troubling example of how powerful financial institutions can attempt to silence legitimate public interest reporting through legal intimidation. This case exemplifies the growing global challenge of SLAPPs – strategic lawsuits designed not to seek justice but to burden critics with costly legal defense until they abandon their criticism.

The disproportionate nature of Bakai Bank’s financial demands (€1,050,000), coupled with the excessive penalties sought (€10,000 per day for non-compliance), clearly indicate that this lawsuit aims to intimidate rather than to address any genuine legal grievance. Moreover, the timing of the legal action – filed 18 months after the publication of ODF’s reports – suggests a calculated effort to exhaust ODF’s resources and deter future investigations.

This case must be understood within the broader geopolitical context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the international sanctions imposed in response. The effectiveness of these sanctions depends critically on transparency and accountability, which organizations like ODF provide through their investigative work. When such organizations face legal harassment for exposing potential sanctions circumvention, the entire sanctions regime is undermined.

The evidence presented in this report demonstrates that ODF’s reporting was based on credible sources and aimed at serving the public interest by highlighting potential vulnerabilities in the sanctions enforcement framework. Numerous independent sources have since confirmed patterns of sanctions evasion through Kyrgyz financial institutions, with the US Treasury even sanctioning one of the banks mentioned alongside Bakai Bank in ODF’s reports.

The international community, particularly the European Union which has recently adopted anti-SLAPP legislation, must take a firm stand against such abuses of the legal system. Protecting civil society’s ability to monitor and report on sanctions circumvention is not merely about defending free speech – it is about preserving the effectiveness of a critical tool in responding to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

As this case proceeds through the Belgian courts, it will serve as an important test of Europe’s commitment to protecting public interest journalism and civil society’s crucial watchdog function. The outcome will have implications far beyond this specific dispute, potentially affecting the willingness of organizations to expose sanctions evasion schemes in the future and, by extension, the integrity of the global sanctions regime itself.

Read also:

1. Submission to the European Parliament and European Commission on the issue of sanctions circumvention (July 3, 2023)
2. Russia’s Accomplices in the War Against Ukraine. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Army’s Reliable Rear (May 9, 2023)